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Patterns of Arab Gulf exports: implications for industrial diversification 
of increased inter-Arab trade 
Introduction 
The development of a strong and viable industrial structure has long been a major 
economic objective of the nations making up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 1 
For many of these states, industrial development is the key to successful economic diver-
sification and the main assurance of continuing self-sustaining growth. Following the 
large increases in oil revenues in the 1970s, Gulf governments have directed a substantial 
portion of their huge development outlays towards the creation of an adequate industrial 
infrastructure and the establishment of certain major state-owned heavy industries. 2 
The recent turnaround in the world oil market and thus in OPEC revenue prospects has 
produced a challenge for Gulf industrialization: perhaps earlier than expected, it is now 
being reevaluated in terms of the time, capital and hopes invested in it. 
In studying the process of industrialization in the Gulf, both proponents and critics 
have arrived at negative assessments in recent years. 3 For those who advocated in-
dustrial development as a path towards greater self-reliance and reduced dependence on 
foreign products, progress has been slow and often extremely costly, relative to the gains 
achieved by other developing countries, especially those in East and Southeast Asia. 
Given the somewhat limited domestic markets of the Gulf states,4 a key to the 
ultimate success of their industrial strategy will be the ability of these countries to 
develop industrial exports. 5 The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the prob-
lems the Gulf states are encountering in their attempts at increasing such exports. Have 
exports to certain regions aided industrial development more than exports to other 
areas? Have exports affected the industrial development of all the Gulf states in a similar 
manner, or are there significant country-by-country differences? 
Industrialization models 
Prior to 1970, the aim of developing country industrialization was import-substitution. 
Initially, this type of industrial policy attempted to break the existing division of coun-
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in February, 1981, and is composed of six Persian Gulf states: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Hereafter, collectively these states will be referred 
to as the ,,GCC countries" or the ,,Gulf states." 
2 In the first half of the 1970s, the public sectors of the six Gulf states invested close to $560 million in manufacturing in-
dustry representing 4.8 per cent of their total development expenditure during that period. In the second half of the 
decade, total investment in industry rose to $15 billion or close to 14 per cent of total investments. In the 1980-85 period 
the figure rose to $40 billion representing 13 per cent of total investments. See Henry T. Azi.am, The Gulf Economies 
in Transition, (London: Macmillan, 1988) pp. 121-122. 
3 For a brief assessment of this debate, see Azzam, The Gulf Economies in Transition, chapter 8. 
4 Most of the GCC states have quite small populations: Bahrain-0.5 million; Kuwait - 0.6 million; Oman - 1.5 million, 
Qatar - 0.5 million; Saudi Arabia - 12.8 million; and, the United Arab Emirates - 1.9 million. Sources: respective 
1992 Country Reports prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit, London. 
5 Atif A. Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States, (London: Croom Helm, 1984) p. 2-4. 
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tries between the producers and exporters of raw materials on the one hand and ex-
porters of manufactured goods on the other. It singled out processes using raw materials 
previously exported or under-exploited and favored bulky products (cement, other 
building materials, and furniture) or those with short shelf lives (certain processed 
foods). 
Although import-substitution proved to be a useful first step in building an industrial 
structure, and still has an important role to play in the Gulf, on its own it cannot lead to 
full industrialization. Several factors limit the efficacy of import substitution. Its func-
tionally defined role of substituting only for existing categories and quantities of imports 
is not a progressive or dynamic policy suggesting secondary stage efforts to substitute 
for the intermediate and capital goods brought in to build and operate the import-
substitution plant. 6 
Moreover, the success of an import substitution policy is gauged by its ability to meet 
existing levels of demand. There is no great pressure to increase local use of a particular 
product in the interest of greater economies of scale, or to challenge the appropriateness 
of the import product being substituted or the technology by which it was produced 
when still an import. 
Another factor limiting the efficacy of import substitution is its inability to contribute 
positively to the balance of payments. Most often, a country remains essentially a low 
unit price commodity exporter and an importer of a wide range of manufactured goods, 
leaning towards machinery and industrial feedstock. Import substitution eases but does 
not eliminate the trading disadvantage of a developing country vis-a-vis the industrializ-
ed world. 
The arrogation of monopoly rights, often to state-owned entities, is another develop-
ment associated with, but not necessarily demanded by, the adoption of import substitu-
tion policies in the manufacturing sector. The lack of market-inspired competition can, 
in certain circumstances and without other corrective measures, lead to quality 
deterioration, uncertain attitudes ~rds profit, lack of interest in technological innova-
tion and acquiescence if depressed market conditions create idle capacity. 
In contrast to these typical limitations, in many of the Gulf states import substitution 
industries have grown up in the private sector and in a much less protected environment. 
Consequently, competition on pricing and quality has been intense and manufacturers 
are now prepared to enter export markets. Those industries utilizing gas (both 
associated and non-associated) are capital intensive and heavy, in direct contrast to those 
normally associated with export-orientation. They use gas either as feedstock and 
energy source, as in petrochemicals and nitrogenous fertilizers, or as an energy source, 
as in basic metal industries with a high energy content such as steel and aluminum. 
Capacities are at internationally established maximum feasibility levels, processes are 
very much state-of-the-art, and the export market is worldwide comprising industrializ-
ed and developing countries, except in the case of steel which tends to be regional. 
It is too early to judge the success of this form of industrialization, both in terms of 
profitability and encouragement of local finished plastic and metal products industries. 
However, difficulties have already arisen in selling products into saturated and protected 
markets. Some analysts decry the concentration of Gulf manufacturing efforts on in-
termediate chemical products, claiming an increased dependence on industrialized 
6 Of course, in a few industries (for example, vehicle assembly) there arc attempts to increase use of local inputs. 
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markets for purchase of the product and for supply of the machinery to produce it. 
Nevertheless, arguments along the line of ,,better to be industrialized right or not at all" 
seem rather unrealistic. 
Apart from the debate over whether to develop export-oriented or import-substitution 
industries, there is also the question of whether to opt for capital or labor intensity in in-
dustrializing. Industrial investment in the less densely populated oil-producing Arab 
countries has emphasized capital intensity and a high level of automation. 7 Job creation 
is absolutely not a priority in the industrial development of the Gulf states, with the ex-
ception of Bahrain. Apart from likely technological dependence, the problem with 
capital-intensive industries is their much more limited income distribution function. 
One effect of this over a wide spectrum of industries is to curtail local demand for goods. 
Of course, this might have the effect of enhancing the appeal of entering export markets 
for some categories of industry. 
Problems facing Gulf exporters 
In the Gulf states, as in many other newly industrializing countries, a pronounced divi-
sion has developed between import substitution industries and export-oriented in-
dustries. The former have included building materials, finished plastic and base metal 
products, clothing and detergents; the latter textiles, leather goods, certain agro-
industrial products, petroleum products, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and base metals. 
There have always been certain areas of overlap, especially where a limited local market 
exists for export-oriented goods. In recent years, the need for all industries to be export-
competitive has been emphasized as the limitations of import-substitution became 
clearer. 
Several other factors have encouraged industries in the Gulf states to adopt an export 
orientation. First, state authorities have liberalized exchange regulations to allow ex-
porters to retain foreign currency earned for their own further needs. Indeed, in the open 
oil based economies of the Gulf, currencies are freely convertible and no capital con-
trols exist. 8 Second, many building material industries, in particular, have been con-
structed with capacities that, while economically sensible, are not sustainable by the 
local market alone. 9 This has happened both by design, in instances where a degree of 
regional exporting was envisaged in the original business strategies, or by default as the 
local market has not lived up to expectations. Exporting becomes a necessity to maintain 
or expand capacity and to avoid dependence on the business cycles of one market alone. 
Although the Gulf states are not necessarily major producers, in nearly all traded 
manufactured goods they have been prevented from free trade to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, depending principally on the degree to which sales have been directed toward the 
European Community, American, or Japanese markets. 10 The advanced industrial na-
7 Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States, pp. 16-17, and 102-104. The lack oflarge pools 
of low-cost labor effectively eliminates a large subset of industries (many textiles, consumer goods and even some capital 
goods). 
8 These qualities permit the use of useful proxies for economic activity when data is unavailable. For example, in the case 
of Kuwait and several other GCC countries, the total value of monthly check (cheque) clearings provides a good proxy 
for non-oil sector production in nominal terms. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - Kuwait, No. 3 
(1992), (London: EIU, 1992) p. 6. 
9 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - Saudi Arabia 1991-1992, (London: EIU, 1991), p. 22. 
10 EIU, Country Profile - Saudi Arabia 1991-1992, p. 23. 
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tions have erected numerous barriers to industrial imports from developing countries in 
order to protect their own industries. The methods used have included quantitative 
restrictions such as quotas, banning all imports above a certain value or volume, import 
duties imposed after duty-free ceilings have been triggered, and anti-dumping duties. 
There are also non-tariff barriers such as quality control and the insistence on 
unreasonable specifications. 
For the GCC countries, as early as 1986 the situation had deteriorated to the point 
where the European Economic Community (EEC) had imposed protective duties on 
seven of Saudi Arabia's new petrochemical exports, on urea exports from Kuwait and on 
methanol exports from Bahrain. The tariffs ranged between 8 and 14.5 per cent and were 
imposed automatically as soon as very low duty-free ceilings (no more than $1-2 million 
of each product) were breached. 
In fact, the Gulf states have so far fared no better than other developing countries in 
gaining access to the EEC market, especially with regard to their major industrial ex-
port to date - petrochemicals. At one point the EEC imposed 13.4 per cent custom 
duties on polyethylene from Saudi Arabia claiming that Saudi exports of this product ex-
ceeded 15 per cent of annual EEC consumption. 11 The imposition of such duties, given 
the high cost of production and ancillary plant, means that those industries in the Gulf 
show little if any economic return, especially if the cost of energy and feedstock is 
calculated at world prices. 
Several analysts have gone so far as to argue that EEC duties are an attempt to under-
mine the viability of Gulf petrochemicals industries. 12 They see EEC actions as an at-
tempt to destroy the principle of downstream development of the oil industry in the Gulf, 
and thus to abort plans underway in the Gulf to create a varied and integrated economy 
in the region. 
It is clear that oil dominates Gulf exports to the EEC with petrochemicals remaining 
a small share of GCC exports to the Community. Overall, in 1990, 92 per cent of total 
exports from Oman, 92 per cent from Kuwait, 91 per cent from Saudi Arabia, 84 per 
cent from Qatar, 78 per cent from Bahrain, and 68 per cent from the United Arab 
Emirates were in the form of crude oil or refined oil products exports. 13 
EEC decision makers have used a variety of reasons to justify their exclusionary ac-
tions. Thus they have pointed out that Saudi Arabia exceeded the ceiling agreed upon 
under the GSPA. Realistically, it is clear that the entry of Saudi petrochemicals to Euro-
pean markets came at an awkward moment since the economic slowdown in the early 
1980s badly affected European petrochemical industries, leaving them with 15-20 per 
cent idle capacity. This led to the closure of some 20 plants with the loss of 7,000 jobs 
11 Azzam, The Gulf Economics in Transition, p. 144. 
12 Ramzi Zaki, ,,Exporting Growth Potential Hindered by Lack of Co-ordination," Arab Industry Review 1986 / 87, p. 21. 
13 Data derived from respective 1992 Country Reports published by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The relatively low 
figure for the UAE reflects the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990-91 Gulf War. The UAE has benefited substan-
tially from the reopening of the Iranian market and from its ability to service the reconstruction demands of Kuwait 
following the Gulf War. Exports from UAE light manufucturing have risen and re-exports have benefited from port and 
related transport activity. While the benefits going to the UAE from Kuwait's misfortune will soon abate, nevertheless 
the UAE's gain from its location as a transport and business center is probably permanent - mainly because the lower 
Gulf is now seen as more secure than the upper Gulf (see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - United Arab 
Emirates, No. 3 (1992),(London: Elli) p. 5. Although Kuwait is expected to have earned about $7 billion from oil exports 
in 1992, naphtha and petrochemicals are expected to yield only $300 million (see EIU, Country Report - Kuwait, No. 
3 (1992), p. 5. Even in the case of Saudi Arabia, petrochemicals and plastics account for only 6 per cent of export earnings 
(see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - Saudi Arabia, No. 3 (1992), (London: Elli) p. 3. 
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around the EEC. 14 In line with the recommendations of an OECD study, by 1990 even 
more plants closed in an attempt to balance supply and demand and stem the tide of ris-
ing losses. 15 
The Gulf states argue that the introduction of petrochemicals (particularly those from 
Saudi Arabia) was not the cause of the decline of European petrochemical industries. 
The problems of recession and uneconomic production existed long before Saudi Arabia 
began exporting its products. As they see it, European petrochemical industries expand-
ed their productive capacity on the basis of incorrect estimates of future demand, with 
the result that they installed surplus capacity. 
A consistent position has been taken by the Gulf states on this issue. First, they con-
sider that establishing petrochemical and refining industries is a natural process for 
countries depending entirely on the export of crude oil. It is imperative that they take 
this step in order to diversify their sources of income and to industrialize and develop 
their countries. They further believe that such a position conforms to the principle of in-
ternational division of labor. In any case, the volume of products from GCC states is not 
that large - Saudi Arabia's target is to attain only 5 per cent of the global basic 
petrochemical market. Even with all the Gulf petrochemical producers on stream, the 
region produces no more than 6 per cent of the world's petrochemicals - an amount 
representing no more than one year of projected global industry growth. 16 
Second, in the 1970s through to the mid 1980s, (and to a large extent even today), EEC 
exports entered the GCC countries under relatively low customs duties. For Saudi 
Arabia, under tariff reforms introduced in 1973 and 1974, wide ranging reductions and 
exemptions were announced, although relatively high duties were retained on locally 
produced goods to protect domestic industries. Duties on most items were raised to 4 
per cent in 1984 in conformity with Saudi Arabia's GCC partners and to 7 per cent in 
1985 for revenue reasons. The 1988 Saudi budget raised the basic rate of import duty 
from 7 to 12 per cent and brought virtually all items (excluding some foodstuffs) into the 
import duty category. All goods previously subject to a 10 per cent protectionist tariff 
saw this raised to 20 per cent, and a number of new items were afforded protection for 
the first time at the rate of20 per cent. In 1988 some items of a development nature were 
exempted from the new customs regime. Even with these changes, imports for projects 
licensed under the Foreign Capital Investment Code continue to enjoy wide customs ex-
emptions. 17 Similar tariff changes have occurred in some other GCC countries. 18 
14 Zaki, .,Exporting Growth Potential," Arab Industry Review 1986 /ff!, p. 21. 
15 Au.am, The Gulf Economies in Transition, pp. 142-145. 
16 Az:r.am, The Gulf Economies in Transition, p. 143. Even Gulf states which have not been exporting petrochemicals may 
soon become important new producers. For example, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company(ADNOC) is reportedly con-
sidering a possible entry into world scale petrochemical production. Exploratory marketing surveys are currently under-
way. If the project is deemed feasible it is expected that sometime during 1993 AD NOC may award a front end engineer-
ing design contract fur the ethylene cracker and the other process trains for a 300,000 t I y polyethylene plaot. For further 
details see, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - United Arab Emirates, No. 3 (1992) (London: ElU, 1992). 
Although proposals for Abu Dhabi to diversify to petrochemicals are not new, the current impetus seem to be based on 
the extra low cost gas resources that are now being developed. In the case of other Gulf producers, expansion of produc-
tive capacity is the order of the day. For example, the Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) is undertaking a $400 
million expansion aimed at increasing the company's ethylene production capacity from 300,000 t I y to 4 'Xl,000 t I y over 
the next three year period. QAPCO is taking advantage of the increased availability of gas following the coming on stream 
of Qatar's North Field, using its output as feedstock. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 
4 (1992) (ElU: London, 1992) p. 20. 
17 ElU, Country Profile - Saudi Arabia 1991-1992, p. 37-38. 
18 For example, in Oman, apart from goods imported by the government and by contractors working on government pro-
jects, which are exempt, generally all items attract a 2 per cent ad valorem duty except foodstuftS, gold, and alcohol. In 
1989 a new law was issued authorizing a 25 per cent duty on imports which compete with local products, and a 50 per 
cent tax on imported cement was imposed (see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - Oman I Yemen, 1992-93, 
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Third, the low cost of natural gas used as a feedstock in the petrochemical industry 
is offset by several burdens on Gulf industries including the cost of transport to the 
petrochemical importing countries, the high capital cost of the industries, the relatively 
high cost of managing the projects, the rapid rate of depreciation and high expatriate 
wages. In addition, Gulf petrochemical products, produced mainly from natural gas, are 
largely basic petrochemicals. Intermediate petrochemicals require many other com-
ponents which are not currently manufactured in the GCC countries and are therefore 
imported from abroad. The basic petrochemicals which are exported are themselves 
feedstocks for final petrochemicals which are in tum exported back in large quantities 
from the EEC to Arab countries. 
Fourth, the most favored nation treatment accorded by UNCTAD to the developing 
countries means that their manufactured and semi-manufactured products should enter 
the industrial country's markets with low customs duties or with no duties at all. The 
Gulf states feel that this should be interpreted as a flexible doctrine which accords 
preferential treatment to the products of the developing countries in the markets of the 
advanced countries, without obliging the developing countries to reduce their customs 
duties on imports from the industrial countries. · 
Fifth, the EEC does not merely expect to negotiate on behalf of its internal market, 
but would like to extend the terms of negotiations to limiting qualities exported and 
distributed worldwide. The EEC seems to think that the new capacity of factories in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Canada, and Mexico makes world production capacity exceed 
current world demand by 10 per cent. 
Sixth, the GCC countries consider that failure to reach an agreement may result in 
reciprocal treatment leading the GCC countries to impose similar custom duties on im-
ports from the EEC. 
Finally, the Gulf states recognize the importance of reorganizing the industry and trade 
of petrochemicals and refined. products. They do not consider it right to maintain the 
status quo of trade relations by protecting uneconomic high cost industries in a manner 
contradictory to the principles of free trade and international commercial exchange. 19 
From the EEC perspective, there are several other points that need to be considered. 
First, customs tariffs in the EEC are routinely imposed according to legal regulations 
followed by the EEC within the framework of its international commitments. Thus, of-
fering customs duties exemptions on products from the GCC countries without granting 
similar exemptions to all exporters may violate provisions of the GAIT. 
Second, the Europeans never intended to follow a protectionist policy against GCC 
petrochemical products and they do not impose quantitative restrictions. They further 
maintain that there is a misunderstanding and confusion between a pure protectionist 
policy and resolutions imposing customs duties. 
Third, it is argued that low prices of raw materials in the GCC countries give those 
countries an unfair advantage over the European producers of petrochemicals who have 
(London: EIU, 1992), p. 32. In Bahrain duties on imports are generally S per cent ad valorem on foodstuffs and 
necessities, JO per cent on non-essentials, and 20 per cent on cars. Imported aluminum products are subject to 20 per 
cent duty, but duty is waived on capital equipment and raw materials imported for the purpose of establishing a new in-
dustrial enterprise (see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile- Bahrain/Qatar, 1991-92, (London: EIU, 1991), 
p. 22. For Oman duty on most goods is 4 per cent with foodstuffs and reading material generally exempt (see EIU Coun-
try Profile - Bahrain/Qatar, 1991-92, p. 38. 
19 Zaki, ,.Exporting Growth Potential," p. 21. 
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fixed excess capacity. There continues to be surplus capacity even though, for example, 
EEC methanol capacity has been cut. 
Fourth, Saudi products are able to compete with other products within the EEC 
market, even after the imposition of duty. Their competitive position often enables them 
to sell at prices below the prevailing prices. 
Fifth, the Europeans are worried that allowing GCC petrochemical products to enter 
the EEC without customs duty would be tantamount to dumping, given the geographical 
proximity of the Arab producers to Europe. They argue this may be further exacerbated 
by the loss of the European market for these products in the Middle East and Africa as 
a result of competition from the Gulf producers. This might cause the closure of even 
more European factories, aggravating the unemployment situation in the ECC coun-
tries. 20 
Finally, the Europeans wish to establish an international system to rationalize the pro-
duction of petrochemicals. They want the United States and Japan to participate in such 
a system - particularly as some of the Saudi plants are joint ventures, with American 
and Japanese companies having a marketing responsibility. 
The EEC's GSP arrangements for developing countries were first introduced in 1971 
after being proposed by UNCTAD in New Delhi in 1968. They allow for duty free access 
for industrial products from developing countries. In the industrial sector certain pro-
ducts are designated as ,,sensitive" and their duty free access is subject to two forms of 
limits: quotas and ceilings. Stringent individual tariffs and quota limits are applied to 
most competitive products, mainly exported by a small number of newly industrializing 
countries. 
In some quarters it is argued that it is stretching the concept of the GSP to apply it to 
the Gulf oil states' petrochemical exports. It is pointed out that the petrochemical in-
dustries in these states have cost advantages and that they were set up as joint ventures 
with multinational companies which are themselves responsible for marketing the out-
put. The Gulf oil states, on the other hand, see themselves as seriously limited in their 
natural resources and argue that despite their oil revenues they face severe developmen-
tal problems in the long run. Successful industrialization is therefore vital. However, 
European Commission officials point out in turn that the United States does not include 
the Gulf states in its GSP scheme and that the Gulf states seldom complain about 
America's unfavorable treatment. Instead they become angry that once limits are ex-
ceeded under the EEC's GSP, a tariff is imposed by a process that is becoming ever more 
automatic. 
In 1988 it looked as though the EEC would be able to negotiate a two stage trade agree-
ment with the GCC. Terms of the 1988 proposal included provisions for a transition 
period, of perhaps eight to 15 years, during which nothing would change. This would 
have been followed by a degree of liberalization in which the EEC petrochemical in-
dustry would remain protected by anti-dumping measures, safeguard classes and ceil-
ings. It is felt that these would in fact offer better protection than customs duties which 
manifestly do not reduce the flow of petrochemicals into the EEC. The GCC states for 
their part would have had to reduce duties reciprocally to zero in the transitional period, 
but would also have been offered some protection for their industries through an ,,infant 
industries" clause. Ultimately this agreement did not come to fruition. 
20 Azzam, The Gulf Economies in Transition, p. 143. 
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In 1992 negotiations resumed between the EEC and the GCC. The broad nature of the 
discussions underlined the seriousness of the dispute and the interest of both parties in 
reaching acceptable answers to a range of trade issues. As a result of these discussions 
both sides have now resolved to sign a GCC-EEC free trade pact. 21 In general, the 
GCC has reacted positively to the 1992 proposals for a free trade agreement which allow 
the GCC to maintain protectionist tariffs on its newly established industries and which 
sets a shorter timetable than the 1988 proposal for the reduction of EEC barriers to GCC 
petrochemical imports.22 Officials appear hopeful that the signing of an GCC-EEC 
agreement can take place in 1993. However one of the prerequisites for concluding such 
a pact is the implementation of a unified external custom& tariff structure among the 
GCC countries. 23 As discussed later in this paper, favorable agreements among GCC 
partners toward that goal and toward the creation of a common GCC market are set to 
implemented during 1993. Its worth recalling, however, that several previous attempts at 
economic integration have proven unsuccessful. 
In terms of other export markets, the US legislature has several forms of protectionist 
tariff at its disposal, some of which are mandatory and some of which can only be im-
posed following complaints by US manufactures of unfair competition likely to en-
danger their livelihood. Saudi Arabian heavy industries have run into opposition from 
their American counterparts on just such grounds based on the allegation that the 60 per 
cent of capital costs provided in the form of a soft-term loans by Riyadh's Public Invest-
ment Fund represents an ,,unfair" subsidy. 
The Japanese have tended to take a more accommodating line toward the heavy in-
dustrial plans of both their neighbors on the Pacific Rim and of Arab nations. They have 
moved more quickly than their European or North American counterparts to retire 
petrochemical capacity so as to make room for the expected supply from other coun-
tries, and have invested in more complex downstream plastic plants. The more accepting 
Japanese attitude towards Arab petrochemical and other exports is attributable to Japan's 
much more closely coordinated approach to trading relations and Tokyo's acute 
awareness of the need to safeguard energy supplies.24 For national security reasons the 
Japanese have been less willing to dismantle their oil refinery sector. However, similar 
to petrochemicals, they have been prepared to try and find third party markets for Arab 
products when necessary. 
The Saudi belief that foreign equity participation in their products would assure 
market access has been found to be only partly true and only in the cases of Japanese 
and Taiwanese companies. Thus, for example, when the Tuiwanese government issued 
a decree banning imports of urea, it exempted the Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company 
(SAMAD), in which the Tuiwan Fertilizer Company is the joint venture partner. 
Although American companies enfolded in the remainder of the Saudi projects have ex-
pressed their disappointment at European protectionist measures, they have been unable 
21 EIU, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 4 (1992), p. 13. 
22 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Saudi Arabia, No. 2 (1992), (London: EIU, 1992), p. Zl. 
23 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 3 (1992), (London: EIU, 1992), p. 9. 
24 A recent milestone for the Qatar Steel Company (QASCO) is ~tructive. QASCO is 70 per cent owned by the government 
with Japan's Kobe Steel and Tokyo Bokei holding the remainder. 1n 1992 QASCO became the first producer in the region 
to be accredited with the Japanese industrial standard and clearly it hopes this will boost sB.les prospects in Japan and the 
Far East. Partly in anticipation, QASCO is reported to have approved plans to double its production capacity. Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 2 (1992), (London: EIU, 1992), p. 23. 
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to force changes and therefore have had to concentrate marketing efforts east of Suez 
where prices have shown considerable weakness in response. 
Over and above the tariff issue, the Saudis have encountered considerable difficulties 
in establishing independent overseas marketing networks for both their new petroleum 
product and petrochemical exports. In several cases they have had to entrust (on a tem-
porary basis) the entire marketing effort to foreign partners rather than the 50 per cent 
basis as initially envisaged. Other Arab producers with a longer experience of indepen-
dent oil and oil product marketing to build on seem to have adapted to marketing their 
new industrial output with greater ease, although their sales targets have been con-
siderably sma!ler. Nevertheless, even for some of them foreign equity participation is 
seen as perhaps a necessary route to market access. A 1992 agreement between the 
Qatar Fuel Additives Company (QAFAC) and foreign shareholders is illustrative. 
QAFAC's plans to build a $600 million methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and 
methanol plant include a $120 million equity position held by France's Total and 
Canada's International Octane. These two shareholders have agreed to take up to 50 per 
cent of the plant's output. 2s 
Disillusionment with sales prospects in the more advanced industrial nations has forc-
ed some of the Arab industrial ventures into less conventional marketing techniques, 
such as taking share holdings in potential purchasing companies in countries with large 
markets, for example, China, or Turkey. India has also emerged as a major purchaser 
of Arab fertilizers, somewhat showing a preference for barter deals involving Indian 
engineering contracts. India has struck deals with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Kuwait. A recent agreement is instructive: in 1992 the Qatar Fertilizer Company (QAF-
CO) announced a $400 million expansion of its production capacity of ammonia and 
urea. In justifying this expansion, QAFCO stated it has signed a three year deal with In-
dia for the sale of 100,000 t I y of ammonia, a deal representing 15 per cent of current 
capacity. 26 
New Delhi has also expressed an interest in establishing joint venture factories in the 
Arab world with firm buy-back arrangements to cover the cost of Indian technology. 
Very recently, both India and Pakistan have undertaken new actions to boost trade be-
tween South Asia and the Gulf. For example, in addition to establishing a joint Omani-
Indian commission on economic and technical cooperation, in June 1992 New Delhi an-
nounced that it was removing a range of restrictions imposed on Omani imports. The re-
quirement for Oman to buy Indian goods against exports was also withdrawn. 27 
Similarly, Pakistan recently established a commission on economic and technical 
cooperation with Oman and reassured Oman of its willingness to receive more Omani 
imports as the sultanate's manufacturing industries expand.28 
Barter or countertrade might have applications in trading with other developing coun-
tries, and is being employed in more and more contracts with industrial nations where 
established trading firms are to be found which can be persuaded to market Gulf 
petrochemical or aluminium products. Since other Arab countries like Egypt, Syria, 
Morocco and Algeria found that broad trade agreements with the old Soviet Union and 
its partners in the now defunct Comecon proved a useful means of exporting in-
25 EW Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 2 (1992), p. 18. , 
26 EIU Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 4 (1992), p. 20. 
27 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Oman, Yemen, No. 3 (1992) (London: EIU, 1992), p. 13. 
28 EIU, Country Report: Oman, Yemen, No. 3 (1992) p. 13. 
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termediate and consumer industrial goods, it is not surprising that there was increased 
contact and exploratory trade talks between the Gulf states and Comecon before the lat-
ter's ultimate collapse at the end of the Cold War. 
Despite some success in exporting industrial products, given global market condi-
tions and expanding productive capacities, the Gulf states need to reexamine the pros-
pects for enhancing their exports to other countries within the region. 
Contribution of inter-Arab trade to industrial diversification 
Within the Arab world, multi-good barter arrangements have been worked out which 
often represent a useful means of establishing complementarity in trading patterns. A 
trade payments clearing system operated in non-convertible currency between Arab cen-
tral banks can also encourage trade in industrial goods, without pre-specification of 
volumes and goods. Arab countries are also beginning to address the issue of govern-
ment involvement in encouraging and facilitating non-traditional exports, through ex-
port exhibitions and other promotions, and through export credit, insurance and other 
financial support. 
In examining the amount of trade between the Gulf states, several positive factors en-
courage the growth of such trade and several negative factors retard its growth. Positive 
factors include geographical proximity, and thus reduced transport costs; high per capita 
income and thus high demand for imports; the absence of exchange controls in most 
states in the region; the absence of customs barriers or quotas in most states; and, final-
ly, a high tendency in the region to import. 
The increase in the volume of trade in manufactured goods between the Gulf states in 
the past decade is directly related to the huge increase in the national revenues of these 
states as a result of the increase in oil revenues. Higher per capita income levels created 
a radical change in consumption patterns with an enormous growth in demand for con-
sumer goods and capital goods. 
Even though the greater part of the new demand for commodities was met by imports 
from the advanced industrial countries, the Gulf states themselves gained a share of the 
market from re-exports and from the trading of the products of their own industries. 
Thus these industries are beginning to make an impact, despite the lack of co-ordination 
in industrial development in the region until recently. 
As noted above, given the problems associated with trade to the advanced countries 
and the limited size of national markets, especially in the GCC region, the possibility 
of inter-Arab trade is being examined ever more seriously as possible means of further-
ing the industrial diversification process. 29 A critical question arises ·concerning 
whether or not this type of trade has been much of a stimulus to industrialization in other 
Arab countries. Also, has it been more effective in this regard than trade to the non-Arab 
developing world or to countries in what was until very recently the ,,socialist bloc"? 
To shed some light on these questions, an analysis was made of the geographical pat-
tern of Arab global exports. Here, we were particularly interested in determining the 
manner and extent, if any, to which industrial diversification in the Arab countries was 
correlated to their geographical pattern of trade. More specifically were exports to some 
regions of the world more conducive to industrial development than exports to other 
29 Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States. 
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regional areas? Did this pattern change over time as industrial diversification proceeded 
in the Gulf states? 
The main trading areas considered were (a) industrial countries, (b) members of the 
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), (c) developing countries and (d) members of the then 
socialist bloc. To gain some sense of change over time, beginning in 1975 three five year 
intervals were examined (due to incomplete data for 1985, 1984 was the terminal 
year).30 
To determine the relative importance over time of domestic and external markets, size 
variables were added to the analysis. Three variables were used to proxy the relative 
economic size of each country: (a) share of Arab Monetary Fund countries' population, 
(b) share of Arab Monetary Fund countries' Gross Domestic Product, and (c) relative 
economic size - (a) times (b). 
Factor analysis was used as the analytical technique. This method was adopted largely 
because it allowed for the identification of correlation patterns - was manufacturing 
development correlated with any exports to one particular region(s)? In addition, factor 
analysis facilitates the ranking of countries in terms of each of the main dimensions in 
the data - the ranking in terms of economic size, importance of exports to the Arab 
Monetary Fund countries and so on. 
Using factor analysis also facilitates the construction of an industrial diversification 
index. Rather than being confined to one arbitrary measure of industrial diversification, 
such as share of income, a principal component of industrial diversification can be 
created out of several individual measures. Here the share of industry in total absorption 
(consumption plus investment) and the share of industrial output in non-oil GDP were 
used to construct the principal component depicting industrial diversification. In a 
similar manner, export indices were created for each country's exports to each of the 
four regions in terms of its share of (a) non-oil Gross Domestic Product, and (b) its share 
of Gross Domestic Product. 
Preliminary analysis indicated that four factors were optimal. 31 Table 1 indicates 
several results for the initial year, 1975. (See Tuble 1). First, the main trend in the data 
set was economic size and exports to the socialist bloc, that is, the larger the country was 
in terms of its income and population the greater its trade with this group of countries. 
Second, in a similar manner, manufacturing was most highly correlated with trade to the 
Arab Monetary Fund countries. The greater the share of exports to non-oil GDP and ex-
ports to total GDP, the higher that country's index of industrial diversification. Third, 
industrial development bore little correlation with exports to the industrial countries -
a finding consistent with the discussion in the previous section. Fourth, in terms of their 
relative ranking on each of these four factors (as depicted by the factor scores, with 
positive scores indicating above average), Bahrain had by far the greatest share of its out-
put exported to other regional Arab countries. Kuwait was next, with the remainder of 
the GCC countries scoring relatively low in terms of their exports to countries in the 
region. Fifth, due to the pattern of oil exports, each of the GCC countries ranked 
relatively high in terms of exports to the industrialized countries (Factor 3). Finally, 
with the notable exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Oman, GCC countries did not rank par-
ticularly high in terms of their trade with the developing world . 
30 Zaki, .,Exporting Growth Potential," p. 21. 




Table I: Arab Monetary Fund Countries: Direction of Exports and Relative /ndustrialiwtion, /<J75 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Socialist Arab Monetary Industrial Developing 
Countries Fund/Manuf Countries Countries 
Socialist I non-oil 0.97* 0.12 O.Ql -0.16 
Socialist/GDP 0.95* 0.10 -0.03 -0.16 
population 0.93* -0.08 -0.09 0.10 
size 0.90* -0.07 0.05 0.39 
AMF exp/ GDP -0.18 0.97* -0.06 -0.27 
AMF exp/non-oil -0.23 0.92* -0.01 0.09 
Manuf/absorption 0.46 0.88* 0,07 -0.06 
Manuf I non-oil 0.33 0.84* -0.08 0.25 
developing I GDP -0.17 0.61* 0.23 0.42 
industrial/GDP 0.02 0.05 1.05* -0.12 
industrial I non-oil -0.07 -0.14 0.82* -0.26 
income 0.26 -0.14 -0.01 0.94* 
developing I non-oil -0.25 0.28 0.06 0.79* 
(Factor Scores) 
Manufacturing AMF Socialist Bloc Industrial Developing 
Countries Countries Countries Countries 
Gulf Economies 
UAE -0.71 -0.68 1.22 -0.08 
Bahrain 3.33 -0.31 0.83 -0.31 
Saudi Arabia 0.59 0.02 1.29 3.16 
Oman -0.84 -0.77 1.49 -0.15 
Qatar -0.38 -0.63 1.21 -0.15 
Kuwait 1.q -0.94 0.98 1.70 
Notes: ()factor scores omitting exports to AMF countries. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: GDP = Gross Domestic Product; non-oil = non-oil GDP; absorption = total expenditures 
(consumption plus investment). 
Source: Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 
(Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
In sum, in terms of relative importance to industrial diversification, exports to fellow 
Arab Monetary Fund countries were the most important, followed by trade to the 
developing countries, socialist countries and finally the industrial countries. 
To determine the relative importance of exports to the Arab Monetary Fund and 
developing countries for the GCC countries' industrial diversification efforts, factor 
scores were computed by leaving out of the factor analysis each of these regions (on a 
one-by-one basis). A fall in the country score on the industrial diversification factor can 
be interpreted as indicating that exports to this region played a positive role in that coun-
try's industrial development. As a basis for comparison, factor scores on the industrial 
factor for non-GCC countries are also listed (See Tuble 2). 32 
As the data in Tuble 2 indicate, first, in general, all of the countries except Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait would have had a lower level of industrial development in the 
absence of trade to the Arab Monetary Fund co~ntries. 33 Second, overall, AMF trade 
32 Zaki, ,,faporting Growth Potential," p. 21. 
33 Zaki, ,,Exporting Growth Potential," p. 21. 
590 ORIENT 33(1992)4 
Table 2: Arab Monetary Fund Countries: Impact of Regional Expons on Relative Industrial Diversification, l<J75 
(Factor Scores - Manufacturing) 
All Omitting 
Regions Arab Monetary 
Fund Countries 
Gulf Economies 
UAE -0.71 -1.09(-) 
Bahrain 3.33 3.00(-) 
Saudi Arabia 0.59 0.94(+) 
Oman -0.84 -0.99(-) 
Qatar -0.38 -0.27(-) 
Kuwait 1.13 1.11(=) 
Other AMF 
Iraq na 
Jordan 0.15 -0.34(-) 
Libya -0.69 -0.66(=) 
PDR Yemen 0.07 -0.27(-) 
Yemen AR -0.71 -0.73(=) 
Egypt -0.12 0.39(+) 
Algeria -0.43 -0.13(+) 
Tunisia -0.28 -0.22(=) 
Sudan -0.37 -0.26(+) 
Syrianana na na 
Somalia -0.01 -0.67(-) 
Morocco 0.00 0.55(+) 
Mauritania -0.72 -0.75(+) 
Notes: ( ) change in relative ranking upon removing regional exports. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: See Table I. 























was of much greater importance to industrial diversification than trade with the develop-
ing world. Oman and Kuwait appear to be the only GCC countries whose industrial 
diversification efforts were stimulated through exports to developing countries. 
By 1980 several significant changes had taken place. (See Table 3). Table 3 indicates 
that manufacturing and AMF trade had become the main trend in the data, with 
manufacturing also loading fairly heavily on the size variables. Moreover manufactur-
ing's correlation with exports to developing countries also appears to have increased 
somewhat. Finally, perhaps as a result of oil exports, the income component of 
economic size had become strongly correlated with exports to the industrial countries. 
Table 4 indicates that by 1980 in terms of relative factor scores the GCC countries 
were still characterized by having a large volume of trade with the industrial countries 
and a small volume of exports to the socialist group. Second, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia, all of the GCC countries were classified as relatively small, with Oman the 
smallest followed by Qatar and the UAE. Third, exports to the AMF countries had aided 
industrial diversification of all of the GCC countries (as evidenced by the reduction of 
manufacturing's factor score when exports to this group of countries was omitted from 
the analysis). Fourth, Oman's industrial diversification appears to benefit most from 
AMF trade, followed by the UAE and Qatar. Finally, developing country trade benefited 
Oman and Kuwait, but had only a marginal impact on the other GCC countries. 
By 1984, after several years of further industrialization in an environment of declining 
oil revenues, another pattern had developed. (See Table 5). As Table 5 indicates, 
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-Table 3: Arab Monetary FUnd Countries: Direction of Exports and Relative lndustriali'Ztltion, 1980 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Arab Monetary Industrial Socialist 
Fund/Manuf Countries Size Countries 
AMF exp I non-oil 0.91* 0.09 -0.15 -0.07 
AMFexp/ GDP 0.85* -0.13 -0.23 -0.05 
Manuf I non-oil 0.79* O.o7 0.61* -0.02 
developing I GDP 0.73* 0.49 -0.17 0.12 
Manuf I absorption 0.73* -0.23 0.57* -0.07 
industrial I non-oil -0.12 0.97* 0.02 -0.04 
industrial I GDP -0.07 0.97* 0.08 -0.10 
income -0.07 0.74* 0.66* -0.02 
developing I non-oil 0.47 0.71* -0.09 0.14 
size -0.06 0.28 0.91* 0.04 
population -0.12 -0.29 0.77* 0.10 
Socialist I non-oil -0.02 0.o7 -0.02 0.98* 
Socialist/GDP -0.05 -0.15 0.14 0.94* 
(Factor Scores) 
Manufacturing Industrial Socialist 
AMF Countries Countries Size Countries 
Gulf Economies 
UAE -0.15 1.00 -0.43 -0.75 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.38 -0.26 -0.74 
Saudi Arabia -0.04 2.14 1.38 -0.68 
Oman -1.00 0.72 -1.20 -0.62 
Qatar 0.36 1.27 -0.86 0.04 
Kuwait 1.17 0.91 -0.36 -0.08 
Notes: ()factor scores omitting exports to AMF countries. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: See Table 1. 
Source: See Table 1 
economic size had increased even more as an impediment to further industrial diver-
sification in the AMF countries. Second, exporting to the AMF had apparently lost 
much of its effectiveness in furthering industrial diversification. However, this decline 
was not significantly replaced by exports to other regions. 
In terms of factor scores, by 1984 industrial diversification had continued in the GCC 
countries with Oman the only country with a significant lag in industrial diversification. 
(See Table 6). As Table 6 also indicates, exports to the AMF and developing country 
groups were still most significant for Bahrain and Kuwait, followed by the UAE and 
.Qatar. Third, as in the past, the GCC countries had a very high dependence on trade to 
the industrial countries with trade to socialist countries oflittle importance. Fourth, all 
of the GCC countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, would have had significantly 
improved levels of industrial diversification if they had not been handicapped by their 
small size. Finally, the table indicates that, most importantly, by 1984 the GCC coun-
tries (and AMF countries) had lost their ability to significantly compensate for their 
small size through increased levels of inter-Arab trade. 
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Table 4: Arab Monetary Fund Countries: Impact of Regional Expons on Industrial Diversification, 1980 
(Factor Scores - Manufacturing) 
All Omitting Omitting 
Regions Arab Monetary Developing 
Fund Countries Countries 
Gulf Economies 
UAE -0.15 -0.68(-) -0.06(=) 
Bahrain 2.75 2.28(-) 2.83(=) 
Saudi Arabia -0.04 -0.21(-) 0.23(=) 
Oman -1.00 -1.65(-) -1.47(-) 
Qatar 0.36 0.04(-) -0.21(=) 
Kuwait 1.17 0.97(-) 0.83(-) 
Other AMF 
Iraq -0.08 0.04 -0.18(-) 
Jordan 0.14 0.32(+) 0.25(+) 
Libya -0.91 -1.36(-) -0.98(=) 
PDR Yemen 1.80 0.48(-) 1.Z7(-) 
Yemen AR -0.88 -0.84(=) -1.04(-) 
Egypt -0.37 0.85(+) 0.22(+) 
Algeria -0.51 O.Z7(+) 0.03(+) 
Tunisia -0.22 0.38(+) 0.10(+) 
Sudan -0.78 -0.58(+) -0.80(=) 
Syria na na na 
Somalia -0.46 -0.74(-) -0.56(-) 
Morocco 0.10 1.40(+) 0.57(+) 
Mauritania -0.88 -0.95(=) -0.95(=) 
Notes: ( ) factor scores omitting exports to AMF countries. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: See Table 1. 
Source: See Table 1 
Table 5: Arab Monetary Fund Countries: Direction of Expons and Relative Industrialization, 1984 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Industrial Arab Monetary Socialist 
Countries Fund Countries Industry Countries 
industrial I non-oil 1.03* -0.16 0.05 0.09 
industrial I GDP 1.02* -0.21 0.04 0.10 
developing I non-oil o.5o• 0.35 -0.01 -0.40 
AMF exp/GDP -0.25 1.01• -0.03 0.04 
AMF exp I non--0il -0.10 0.99* O.Ql -0.02 
developing I GDP 0.40 0.53* 0.02 -0.38 
size -0.18 -0.21 0.85* -0.16 
Manuf I non--0il O.Q7 0.39 0.73• 0.19 
income 0.21 -0.19 0.73• -0.23 
population -0.43 -0.19 0.71• 0.01 
Manuf/absorption 0.23 0.32 0.69• 0.26 
Socialist I non-oil 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 0.94 
Socialist I GDP -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.94 






UAE 1.53 ( 1.44) 0.35 
Bahrain 0.22 ( 0.16) 3.09 
Saudi Arabia 1.48 ( 1.35) -0.20 
Oman -1.13 (-1. 73) -0.10 
Qatar 0.22 ( 0.28) 0.27 
Kuwait 1.10 ( 1.11) 1.10 
Notes: ( ) factor scores omitting exports to AMF countries. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: See Table 1. 
































Notes: () factor scores omitting exports to AMF countries. 
Factor analysis based on oblique rotation. 
Definitions: See Table 1. 
Source: See Table 1 
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0.92 1.51( +) 
-1.19 -1.19(=) 
Despite expanded trade between AMF countries in absolute terms, the results 
presented in this analysis, particularly those obtained for 1984, suggest that a number 
of negative factors may now be preventing exports within this group from significantly 
contributing to industrial diversification. At least ten impediments seem to be at work 
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including (1) the similarity of industrial output in each state and the lack of co-ordination 
between public authorities; (2) the development of identical industrial plants in 
neighboring states (petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel) which has led to increased 
regional competition not cooperation; (3) with each state at a similar stage in its 
development and with similar industrialization strategies, there has been a huge demand 
for capital goods, which are not manufactured in the region; (4) the market in the Gulf 
states is open to the international market; (5) high domestic demand for some manufac-
tured products leaving no surplus for export; (6) the absence of an export promotion 
system; (7) the lack of information on export opportunities in neighboring states; (8) 
minimal import duties on foreign goods from outside the region leading importers to 
continue importing with higher profit margins than trading in regional goods; (9) the 
dumping policy practiced by some foreign companies; and, (10) the high cost of produc-
tion in the Gulf states. 34 
Of these factors, the first is probably most important. Indeed, if we take a look at the 
relationship between the market and productive capacity for industries established in the 
Gulf states we find a common pattern throughout the region. There are multiple dimen-
sions to this pattern including: 
- export oriented industries set up with production capacities much bigger than local 
or even regional demand. This has occurred especially in the petrochemical, fer-
tilizer and aluminum industries. Production in these enterprises is linked to export 
distribution. 
- a number of industries established primarily to meet domestic demand with produc-
tion geared exactly to local demand such as the food and beverage industries. In 
general these industries do not produce a surplus for export. 
- a category of industries with design capacities unable to match domestic demand. 
The state has to supply extra demand through imports or the factories greatly exceed 
design capacity, thereby creating production beyond the economically optimal level. 
- finally, a category of industries to meet the needs of local consumers while offering 
surplus output for export. Given limited local markets and problems in finding 
markets, such industries usually experience considerable idle capacity. 
Although the real solution to increased trade between the Gulf states will require long 
term coordination in industrial development, 35 there are a number of short term 
measures which can be introduced to improve current levels of trade with tangible 
results. 36 These include the abolition of import duties for products originating in other 
Gulf states, removing all obstacles to the free flow of goods between states in the region. 
The six states of the GCC agreed to such measures under the terms of the GCC 
Unified Economic Agreement signed in 1981. It has yet to be fully implemented. 37 
34 Also see the discussion in Au.am, The Gulf Economies in Transition, chapter 8. Some new initiatives suggest greater 
attention is now being paid to export promotion. For example, in 1992 Oman launched the region's first export promotion 
scheme, including the creation of a joint-stock company, the National Marketing Company, set up exclusively to promote 
Oman's non-oil exports in return for a percentage commission on the value of the exports. See EIU, Country Report: 
Oman, Yemen, No. 1 (1992) p. 13 and No. 3 (1992). p. 14. 
35 Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States. 
36 Zaki, .,Exporting Growth Potential," p. 21. 
37 For a concise discussion of the seven parts and 28 articles of the Unified Economic Agreement see, Kubursi, Oil, In-
dustrialization and Development in the Gulf, chapter 1. The main point of the Agreement is to remave economic barriers 
between the six member states and encourage joint projects and investments by Gulf nationals. The ground for a common 
market in the region has, therefore, already been set. Some elements of the Agreement were first put into effect in 1983. 
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Nevertheless, prospects for the GCC regional market currently look much more prom-
ising than during the 1980s. Detailed plans to promote financial and commercial in-
tegration were drafted by the GCC secretariat in 1992 indicating that forward momen-
tum towards integration has been resumed. Indeed regional cooperation is now at the top 
of the GCC agenda. In June 1992 GCC decision makers agreed to a seven year timetable 
for the establishment of a common market and unified external customs tariff structure. 
This was followed with an announcement in September 1992 that member states are now 
committed to implementing a unified system of tariffs by March 1993. 38 Unfortunately 
details of the tariff system have not been revealed. However, it should be noted that 
previous proposals gave considerable leeway for individual states to impose varying 
tariff levels, for example, to protect domestic industries. Nevertheless, some analysts 
are now predicting economic union by the year 20CX>. 39 
Consistent with the data presented here, Bahrain is perhaps the most vigorous propo-
nent of developing a GCC internal market. 40 If such a market comes to fruition Bahrain 
could play an important intermediary role, particularly in finance (based on its offshore 
banking sector) and industry (for example, in supplying aluminum products to the 
region) and in having a well-educated work force. · 
The analysis presented here also suggests that other action may be required against 
unfair competition from foreign imports.41 GCC authorities may need to consider the 
general imposition of protective tariffs to raise the price of imports at least equal to the 
price of locally manufactured goods, especially if the goods are of equal quality and 
standards. The earlier decision of the GCC to impose minimum duties on foreign im-
ports of 4 per cent and a maximum of 40 per cent has proven inadequate to meet the 
problem which exists. 
Finally, regional governments may need to consider preferential purchasing of 
national products by government departments, especially where the local products are 
of similar specifications and quality to the imported alternative. Import license quo-
tas may be needed to force importers toward commodities manufactured within the 
region. 
By itself, the removal of customs barriers is not sufficient to promote increased trade 
between the Gulf states. What is required is a drive towards a developed regional 
economy based on integrated production, with a co-coordinated strategy in foreign trade 
relations to withstand competition from other regional trade groups. GCC decision 
makers also need to analyze very carefully the implications for Gulf economies of un-
folding regional trading blocs such as the proposed NAFTA (between the United States, 
Canada and Mexico) and AFTA (between the six members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) as well the deeper integration of the EEC economies carried 
out at the beginning of 1993. 
38 EJU, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 4 (1992) p. 13. Establishing a unified external customs tariff is one of the prere-
quisites set by the EEC for a GCC-EEC free trade pact. 
39 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Oman, Yemen, No. 2 (1992) (EIU: London, 1992) p. 8. 
40 EJU, Country Report: Bahrain, Qatar, No. 4 (1992) p. 6. 
41 Azzam, The Gulf Economies in Transition, p. 122. 
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Conclusions 
In general inter-Arab trade has declined in relative importance as a factor affecting in-
dustrial diversification in the Arab Gulf region. Several reasons account for this 
development including the lack of an integrated manufacturing base; identical parallel 
development of industries in mutual competition instead of co-operation; the growing 
disparity in income between the oil producers and the non-producers; and, bureaucratic 
problems such as differential customs tariffs and quota systems. 
Such problems cannot be solved quickly and need a massive program of industrial 
development in all parts of the Arab world. The basis needs to be laid now for a planned 
program of co-operation using division of labor to create large markets for viable in-
dustries. Still, an agreement signed in 1992 among the GCC states for the promotion of 
trade between them might provide just such a basis for solving many of the problems if 
it is fully applied, and even better, if it is extended to other Arab countries. Both of these 
actions would provide a vast new market for the industrial exports of the Gulf states. 
As in many other areas of public policy, this vital economic agenda requires several 
critical political decisions. In particular, Arab governments need to be actively engaged 
in: 
- linking free inter-Arab trade with Arab economic integration; 
- separating trade relations from political relations between Arab states so that trade 
is not unduly affected by political factors; 
- co-ordinating Arab economic and trade relationships to withstand the pressure from 
other geographic or economic groups; and 
- agreeing to a level of protection for Arab products against foreign competition. 
In addition to the 1992 agreement between the GCC states, other avenues exist for in-
creasing the flow of inter-Arab trade, for example, bilateral agreements which allow a 
higher degree of flexibility according to specific circumstances than can be covered in 
more general international agreements including all Arab countries. There is no doubt 
whatsoever that the non-oil producing Arab countries could form a critical and logical 
market for the industries of the Gulf states again in the future as they once did in the 
1970s. 
Although this paper has emphasized the external factors which currently limit the 
potential market for Gulf exports, there are key domestic restraints as well. All of the 
Gulf states have expressed a desire to increase their industrial exports, yet in reality 
there is a lack of any clear link between investment and production policy on the one 
hand, and export strategy on the other. Simply put, with the notable exception of the 
petrochemical industry, there has been a lack of sound assessment of export potential. 
This omission could and should be readily addressed by each of the Gulf governments. 
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